International conditions surrounding Japan are becoming increasingly difficult with the passage of every year as the nation finds itself tangled in a web of thorny issues with neighboring countries. These include insufficient transparency over China’s military build-up and offensive stance in the East China Sea and South China Sea, North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons and missiles, and Russia’s efforts to justify its unlawful rule over Japan’s Northern Territories through rearmament of its Far Eastern District and the president’s visit to the Northern Territories.

It is reported that during the April through September period of 2011, the number of emergency responses by Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces scrambling to intercept Chinese aircraft increased by 3.4 times from the previous year. In the past, Japan held an overwhelming advantage over China in terms of naval and air power. Today, we are seeing a decisive shift in power as these advantages move from Japan to China. It is critically important to have an awareness of this ongoing change.

So, what should Japan do? Diplomacy stands on a foundation of power. As explained in the previous installment of “Actions,” diminished power ultimately leads to a situation in which the government is unable to protect the lives and property of its people. The nation then finds itself trampled upon and forced to acquiesce to the will of others. Raising the level of all forms of power is extremely important, particularly because we wish for peace.

These issues will be treated in greater detail in a forthcoming series of “Actions” dedicated to the subject of national defense. The discussions of the present installment will be limited to the question of how the level of hard power, a crucial factor in diplomacy and foreign relations, can be effectively raised. To protect the people’s lives and property and to maintain peace, it is necessary to be strong.

1. Basic Policy for National Defense Must be Revised

Basic policies pertaining to Japan’s national security (national defense) are defined in the Basic Policy for National Defense that was approved by the Cabinet in 1957. More than 50 years have elapsed since this document was framed. However, during this entire time, it has not been revised even once. When the one-percent of GDP ceiling on defense expenditures was lifted in 1987, the Cabinet approved the “Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability” which identified the following four principles as constituting the basic policies on national defense: (1) commitment to exclusively defense-oriented policy, (2) Japan will not become a military power that threatens other countries, (3) commitment to civilian control, and (4) commitment to the three non-nuclear principles. These basic principles remain unchanged to the present.

Since the Basic Policy for National Defense was formulated in 1957, Japan’s foreign relations and its national security environment have changed dramatically. For instance, national security threats have become globalized (transnational risks) and ballistic missiles have proliferated around the world. Obviously, these conditions go beyond the assumptions underpinning the conventional thinking on exclusively defense-oriented policy.

Therefore, Japan must urgently reformulate its basic policies on national security in a way that is convincing and transparent for both the Japanese people and the international community in light of its current national interests and international role.

2. Enhance the Effectiveness of Joint Management of the Japan-US Alliance

Japan’s Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces responded to the Great East Japan Earthquake by dispatching a total of 100,000 members to the disaster zone. At the same time, the US military forces in Japan and the Pacific Fleet dispatched 10 naval vessels and more than 18,000 service men and women from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to carry out Operation Tomodachi. Immediately after the earthquake, the US military forces focused on conducting search and rescue missions. Later on they responded to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and supported the recovery effort. Operation Tomodachi served to deepen the Japanese public’s awareness of the importance of the Japan-US alliance in Japan’s national security.

To help the Japan-US alliance function more smoothly, the government’s interpretation of the constitutional restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense should have been revised by now. However, this revision continues to be postponed. The current interpretation places Japan in a difficult bind. For example, suppose US naval vessels come under attack from a third country before Japan itself is attacked. Can Japan protect the US vessels? Or, can Japan intercept missiles fired toward the United States? Under the current interpretation of the constitution, Japan cannot exercise the right of self-defense in any of these cases. The Japan-US alliance provides the foundation for Japan’s foreign relations and its national security policies. Therefore, it is vitally important to strengthen the sense of mutual trust and to enhance the effectiveness of the joint management of the alliance. For this purpose, I strongly urge the Japanese government to fulfill its responsibility and to make a political decision and commitment to moving forward on the issue of the right of collective self-defense. Needless to say, the government must also act to reach a speedy resolution on the Futenma issue.

3. Review the Three Principles on Arms Exports

The Three Principles on Arms Exports established in 1967 by the Sato Cabinet prohibited the export of arms to communist bloc countries, countries subject to arms exports embargo under UN Security Council resolutions, and countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. However, the scope of these principles was substantially expanded in 1976 under the Miki Cabinet. Specifically, the export of both arms and equipment for arms production was banned to all countries. As a result, Japan adopted a total ban on the export of arms not only to the original three target regions but also to all countries of the world, including its ally, the United States.

In later years, some revisions were made to the total ban. First, the provision of arms technologies to the United States was allowed as an exception. Second, joint Japan-US development and production of defensive missiles was excluded from the Three Principles on Arms Exports. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the scope of the revision and easing of the Three Principles on Arms Exports has remained very limited, making it difficult to eliminate a number of nagging problems.

First among these problems is that Japan’s defense industry is unable to fully participate in joint development projects with the United States and other friendly countries. Consequently, the manufacturing and technological foundations of Japan’s defense industries are in decline.

Second, because it is isolated from international markets, Japan’s defense industries cannot benefit from the economies of scale. Hence, to protect domestic manufacturers, the government is forced to purchase high-cost domestic products. This drives up procurement costs.

Third, some of the obsolete arms and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces can still be used by developing countries, but cannot be exported under the current rules. In today’s world, the joint production of weaponry has become a standard element in arms policies. This is particularly true in the U.S. and in other democratic countries in Western Europe. By shutting itself out from these joint projects, Japan suffers significant disadvantages in both the performance and cost of arms.

In light of these problems, the conditions added under the Miki Cabinet should be eliminated and Japan should return to the original spirit of the Three Principles on Arms Exports adopted in 1967. In contemporary terms, the ban on arms exports should be limited to countries that may pose a threat to Japan, countries subject to arms exports embargo under UN resolutions, and countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.

4. Actively Participate in International Peacekeeping Operations

One option for Japan would be to, as a rule, actively participate in all peacekeeping operations (PKO). To some, this “Action” may appear unrealistic. However, Japan’s willingness to work toward improving the international security environment and its support for peace-building and nation-building in countries recovering from war and conflict can become a symbol of Japan’s relations with the rest of the world.

There are many ways to contribute to PKO activities. In addition to participating in core PKO functions, there are such possibilities as contributing to international relief and support activities, election observation missions, medical relief activities, police and administrative support, and the dispatch of headquarters liaison personnel. One idea would be to use these activities to bolster Japan’s international presence.

5. Nationwide Discussion of National Defense and Security

The Self-Defense Forces represent the most important organization, alongside the US military, for protecting Japan in the case of emergency. The Self-Defense Forces have steadily earned the public’s respect and appreciation through long years of engagement in disaster relief activities both in Japan and overseas, humanitarian relief, and international peacekeeping operations. In particular, the immense efforts and contributions made by the Self-Defense Forces in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake brought emotion-laden tears to the eyes of many in the stricken areas. However, the unfortunate truth of the matter is that the public has never engaged in a full and mature discussion of the significance of the Self-Defense Forces, national defense, and national security.

Issues related to the US military bases in Okinawa have a long history, as a result of which local residents have been made to bear an unequal and excessive burden. While paying due attention to this problem, the governments of Japan and the United States must work closely together to resolve the outstanding issues. The joint Japan-US use of defense facilities should be promoted to achieve the following: (1) reduce the burden of bases in Okinawa, and (2) strengthen the cooperative ties between the Self-Defense Forces and the US military. It is hoped that the two governments will examine the joint use of military bases in the future as a means to strengthening and maintaining the Japan-US alliance.

The above five proposals comprise the “Action” for enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities, the hard power that buttresses Japan’s foreign policy. Sadly, however, the old pattern of politicians avoiding difficult problems and hard choices is very much evident in this area. The following five points are of particular concern: (1) the fact that the Basic Policy for National Defense has not been revised since its adoption in 1957; (2) the prevalence of legal frameworks and constitutional interpretations that obstruct the efficient operation of the Japan-US alliance; (3) the failure to rectify the meaningless provisions of the Three Principles on Arms Exports that have considerably undermined the development of Japanese industries and the nation’s defense capabilities; (4) indecisiveness and hesitation in contributing to the international community; and (5) the avoidance of straightforward public debate on national defense and national security, and the clinging to idealistic positions and statements. The troubling question is: How does the public view this situation? Are the politicians really committed to pursuing a diplomatic program for Japan? Are they really prepared to protect Japan’s national interests and to preserve the lives and property of the people?

In the past, Japan held an overwhelming advantage over China in terms of naval and air power. Today, we are seeing a decisive shift in power as these advantages move from Japan to China. It is critically important to have an awareness of this ongoing change. Politicians, bureaucrats, and the members of the general public must think, discuss, and act on this awareness.

Acknowledgment: I am indebted to Dr. Tsuneo Watanabe (Tokyo Foundation) and Dr. Ken Jimbo (Keio University) for their cooperation in writing this “Action” and would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude.